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This paper studies the role of institutional investors (pension fund, insurance companies and investment 
companies) in the development of the financial sector and economic growth in OECD countries by 
employing a dynamic panel VAR. While pervious studies in this area have mainly focused on contractual 
savings institutions of pension funds and insurance companies, we provide a consistent analysis of 
institutional investors that includes pension funds, insurance companies, and investment companies both 
at the aggregated and disaggregated levels. At the aggregate level, we found that institutional investors 
significantly Granger causes stock market developments and economic growth. However, we do not find 
such evidence with the banks. At the disaggregated level, we found that market capitalization Ganger 
causes the development of contractual savings institutions of pension funds and insurance companies. 
While these contractual savings institutions Granger causes liquidity and turnover in the stock market, the 
results suggest that the maturity and large coverage of these institutional investors have diluted the impact 
in deepening the stock market. In turn, the ‘risk averseness’ of these contractual savings institutions in 
holding large capitalized and diversified stock portfolio verifies the reverse causality evidence. Contrary 
to a passive ‘buy and hold’ strategy, the unidirection causality to both market liquidity and turnover 
verifies that contractual savings institutions actively manage their portfolios. Another key finding of this 
study is the significant role of investment companies in Granger causing both financial sector 
development and economic growth. While both contractual savings institutions exhibit uni-directional 
causality on economic growth, we found a dynamic relationship between investment companies and 
growth due to the risk taking activities of investment companies. 
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1. Introduction  
The importance of financial institutions in economic development, especially the 
role of stock markets and banks is greatly discussed in both theoretical and empirical 
studies (see Levine (2003) for the survey of the literature). The key findings of these 
studies are that countries with better developed financial institutions tends to growth 
faster, particularly the size of the banking system and the liquidity of the stock 
markets tend to have strong positive impact on economic growth (Beck and Levine, 
2002; Beck et. al., 1999; Arestis et. al., 2001). As compared to stock markets and 
financial intermediaries, studies on the role and function of non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) in the overall economic development have been very sparse in the 
literature. Although most studies predict the impact of financial institutions on 
economic growth, they do not explicitly discuss the issues of causality and the impact 
of non-bank financial institutions on economic growth. In this paper, we explicitly 
study the impact of non-bank financial institutions, in particular the impact of 
institutional investors on economic growth of the OECD countries in a dynamic 
framework. 
Non-bank financial institutions, especially institutional investors such as 
pension funds, insurance companies and investment companies, have increasingly 
become an important component of the financial sector
1. Recent studies tend to 
highlight the importance of institutional investors in the overall development of the 
financial markets in OECD countries over the past 3 decades (Merton and Bodie, 
1995; Vittas, 1998; Impavido et. al., 2000). However, the key shortcomings of these 
studies are that they do not address the impact of the institutional investors on the 
development of the financial sector and the overall economic growth of the domestic 
                                                            
1 Institutional investors as defined by OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook include pension funds, 
insurance companies and investment companies. In this study we follow this definition very closely.   4 
economy. In fact, most of these studies have only focused disproportionately on the 
study of pension funds. The key thrust of the paper is to study the impact of non-bank 
financial institutions on economic growth in a dynamic framework of the panel vector 
autoregressive model (PVAR). The main objective of this paper is to analyze the 
causal relationship between the growth of institutional investors, financial sector 
development (banks and stock market) and economic growth. The paper studies two 
key causality issues with respect to institutional investors. The paper studies whether 
the financial sector development (banking and stock market) is a precondition for the 
growth of institutional investors or whether institutional investors stimulate financial 
market developments. Secondly, the paper also studies whether institutional investors 
contribute directly to economic growth, even after controlling for bank and stock 
market contributions. 
This study incorporates the ‘dynamic’ causality role of institutional investors 
in a PVAR framework
2. The advantage of using the PVAR is that in addition to the 
cross-sectional variability, it also accounts for the time-series variability in the data, 
thereby providing the dynamic framework to study the causal relationship between 
variables in a panel framework. In a purely cross-sectional analysis, the unobserved 
country-specific effect is highly correlated with the error term and hence the 
regression leads to biased estimation. To control for the unobserved effects, Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981) propose to ‘first-difference’ the estimation equations to eliminate 
the unobserved effects and then use the instrumental variables to control for the 
endogeneity in the model. However, Arellano and Bond (1991) highlighted that the 
instruments do not completely controls for the potential endogeniety of all regressors. 
                                                            
2 See Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) on the application of PVAR framework on the study of equity 
markets and economic growth. Our study fundamentally differs from theirs in terms of focusing on the 
dynamic relationship between institutional investors, financial markets (stock markets and banks) and 
economic growth.   5 
As proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), we used a General Methods of Moments 
(henceforth, GMM) technique that uses instruments based on previous realizations of 
the explanatory variables to account for the endogeniety in our model, which robustly 
accounts for the endogeniety of the regressors and hence provides more efficient and 
unbiased estimation. The study covers 23 OECD countries over a span of thirteen 
years from 1988 to 1999.  
The results of our study suggest that institutional investors have strong causal 
impact on stock market development and economic growth, but not on the 
development of the financial intermediaries. The disaggregated analysis of different 
components of institutional investors indicates that the stock market variable of 
market capitalization Ganger causes the development of contractual savings 
institutions of pension funds and insurance companies. While these contractual 
savings institutions Granger causes liquidity and turnover in the stock market, the 
results suggest that the maturity and large coverage of these institutional investors 
have diluted the impact in deepening the stock market. In turn, the ‘risk averseness’ of 
these contractual savings institutions in holding large capitalized stock portfolio 
verifies the reverse causality evidence. Contrary to a passive ‘buy and hold’ strategy, 
the uni-direction causality to both market liquidity and turnover verifies that 
contractual savings institutions actively manage their portfolios. There is also strong 
evidence that the activities of the investment companies Granger causes both the 
financial markets and economic growth.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 identifies the channels 
through which institutional investors augments the efficiency of financial markets. In 
this section, possible economic growth impact through the financial markets is also 
discussed and a preliminary description of institutional investors in OECD countries   6 
is provided. Section 3 outlines the data and panel methodology employed in this 
paper. Results are discussed in Section 4.  The conclusions are given in Section 5. 
2.   Institutional Investors, Financial Markets and Economic Growth 
2.1  Institutional Investors and Financial Sector Development 
One of the key contributions of institutional investors is that they tend to 
improve the overall efficiency of the financial sector (Merton and Bodie, 1995; 
Blommestein and Funke, 1998; Davis and Steil, 2001). Basically, there are six 
functions that institutional investors perform, regardless of the type of agent or 
institutional financial functional form. Vittas (1998) clearly highlights that 
institutional investors have played a key role in improving the clearing and settling 
systems to facilitate the exchange of goods, services and assets. This include 
improvements in clearing facilities, establishment of central depository agencies, 
pressure for reliable back-office operations and the disintermediation of the bank 
denominated wholesale financial markets through the development of money market 
funds and other instruments like CDs, CP, deposits notes, swaps and repos. Secondly, 
institutional investors’ main contribution to a market is that they are a large and 
reliable source of financial resources. The size and economies of scale enables these 
institutional investors to pool and maximize return for a given risk profile of 
individual investors. Thirdly, institutional investor provides more efficient channels to 
allocate economic resources across geographic regions, industries and also over time. 
While there is still controversy whether institutional investors have contributed to a 
quantitative increase in household savings, the general consensus is that institutional 
investors have qualitatively increased the supply of long-term funds to capital markets 
(Impavido et. al., 2002). Institutional investors have also enabled better diversification 
opportunities across countries and industries. Fourthly, the role of institutional   7 
investors in managing uncertainty and controlling risk through risk pooling and risk 
sharing has led to the development of innovative financial products and investment 
strategies. This include financial innovations like the zero coupon bonds, index 
futures, securitization and the wide use of derivatives. Fifth, institutional investors, 
bestowed with economics of scale, good information and low transactions costs, are 
likely to provide better price information and improve the adjustment of asset prices 
to fundamental values. Study by Davis (1988) shows that the portfolio distributions of 
life insurers and pension funds in five of the G7 countries are strongly influenced by 
relative asset returns, particularly where there are few regulations governing portfolio 
distributions and low transactions costs, as in the United Kingdom and the United 
States
3. Superior ability to employ price information is also another advantage of 
institutional investors. For example, Field (1995) highlights that initial public 
offerings subscribed largely by institutional investors tend to do well as opposed to 
those purchased largely by the general public. Finally, institutional investors also have 
a comparative advantage over individual investors in dealing with issues of corporate 
governance. The size and voting weights of institutional investors helps alleviate the 
asymmetric information problem and principal agent dilemma in corporate 
governance.  
2.2  Institutional Investors and Economic Growth 
As institutional investors play an important role in the development of financial 
markets, they could also contribute to overall economic growth of the domestic 
economy. Given the diverse role of each component of the institutional investors, this 
section seeks to highlight the main contribution of pension fund, insurance companies 
and investment companies to economic growth. Institutional investors interact 
                                                            
3 These results did not hold where transactions costs are high and regulations are strict as in Germany, 
Japan and Canada.   8 
dynamically with both financial sector development and economic growth. Implicit in 
the discussion is the focus on a uni-directional relationship from institutional investor 
development to both financial sector development and economic growth. However, 
this relationship is dynamic with a possibility of reverse causality from either 
economic growth or financial sector development to institutional investors. 
Interestingly the causality permutation between institutional investor, financial sector 
development and economic growth increases once pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment companies are examined individually. 
2.2.1   Pension Fund and Economic Growth 
An ageing population and growing health care cost have made governments to 
move from a defined benefit pay-as-you-go social pension system towards a fully-
funded defined contribution system operated by either the government or the private 
sector, which is expected to reduce government expenditure. Essentially, pension fund 
lengthens the term structure of retail savings. In turn, this promotes the development 
of long-term financing markets and balances the need for foreign capital inflows 
especially in developing countries
4 in financing costly and long-term development 
projects.  
2.2.2   Insurance Companies and Economic Growth 
Services conferred by the insurance companies are fundamental to economic 
growth. From a functional perspective, insurance services have important impact on 
economic growth (Skipper, 1998). Firstly, insurance companies promote financial 
stability and anxiety reduction through the indemnification of risk at the individual, 
societal, corporate and national level. Secondly, insurance companies are viable 
substitutes for costly government social security programs. Thirdly, insurance 
                                                            
4 Holzmann (1997) estimates that Chile’s long-term growth increased 1% to 3% from the effects of the 
pension reform operating via financial markets. 
   9 
companies facilitate trade and commerce at both the domestic and international level. 
Moreover, insurance also facilitates innovation by offering to underwrite new risk 
especially in new growth areas like pharmaceuticals. Fourthly, an insurance company 
mobilizes savings on a contractual basis and transforms the short-term nature of retail 
savings to a longer-term basic, whilst maintaining liquidity for claims. Fifth, and 
perhaps the key role of insurance companies is the enhancement of risk management 
through effective risk pricing, transformation and pooling. Sixth, insurance companies 
encourages loss mitigation by the insured through efficient pricing and insurance 
availability. Finally, insurance companies foster a more efficient capital allocation 
through its prudent investment activities.  
  Economic growth, on the other hand, entails more complex loss exposure and 
greater risk. Risks that were traditionally managed at the individual and societal level 
can be effectively managed at the national and even international level. This 
highlights the possible reverse causality of economic growth causing growth in the 
insurance industry. 
 
2.2.3  Investment Companies and Economic Growth 
A key role of investment companies is its ability to pool and mobilize private 
savings for a large number of households. The ability of investment companies in 
providing liquidity according to the specific needs of its investors, introducing 
innovative product and investment strategies, exploiting arbitrage opportunities and 
diversifying investment across products and national boundaries will enhance the 
financial sector efficiency and this will have a positive spillover effect on the 
economy. 
   10
2.3  Institutional Investors in OECD Countries 
  There has been a rapid growth of the financial asset of institutional investors 
in OECD countries since 1980, rising from US$2500 billion in 1980 to nearly 
US$35000 billion in 1999 (OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook, 1999). 
The financial assets of various institutional investors in OECD countries are given in 
Figure 1. It is clear that the financial asset of pension funds has declined significantly 
from around 35 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1999. Insurance companies have 
relatively maintained its share but there is a significant growth of investment 
companies which accounts for almost 31 percent of all financial assets of institutional 
investors in 1999. 













Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
 
The portfolio allocations of institutional investors are given in Figure 2. 
Generally, the financial assets of institutional investors are composed of bonds, loans, 
shares, foreign securities and other holdings (real estate, etc). Most institutional 
investors are either risk-adverse or are regulated by mandate to hold less risky assets   11
as indicated by the large shareholdings of bonds. We could observe some clear trends 
in Figure 2. It is clear that the size of stock holdings has increased to around 30 
percent in 1999 from a base of 10 percent in 1980, which is mostly accounted by the 
declining loan holdings. Another key observation is the small amount of foreign 
securities held by institutional investors, which indicates a significant biasness 
towards domestic financial assets. 

























Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
 





































Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook, World Development Indicators and the 
Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (various years). 
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The trends of financial assets of institutional investors (FA II), market 
capitalization of stock markets and domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
ratios to GDP are given in Figure 3. While the growth of domestic private credit 
provided by the banking sector has been relatively unchanged, both institutional 
investors and stock market capitalization have experienced a large growth, 
particularly in the 1990’s. This high correlation between the financial assets of 
institutional investors and stock market capitalization in the 1990’s suggest a strong 
dynamic relationship between institutional investment and stock market activities. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of all the variables employed. The panel 
study consists of 23 OECD countries
5 from 1988 to 1999.  
Table 1: The Description of the Key Variables Used in the Study 
GDP  log [Real GDP (1995) in US dollars] 
MC  log [Market Capitalization / GDP] 
VT  log [Value Traded / GDP] 
TR  log [Value Traded / Market Capitalization] 
DC  log [Domestic credit provided by banking sector / GDP] 
IINVEST  log [Financial Assets of Institutional Investors / (Financial Asset of 
Institutional Investors + Market Capitalization + Domestic credit 
provided by banking sector)] 
Pen  log [Financial Assets of Pension Funds / (Total Financial Asset of 
Institutional Investors + Market Capitalization + Domestic credit 
provided by banking sector)] 
Ins  log [Financial Assets of Insurance Companies / (Total Financial 
Asset of Institutional Investors + Market Capitalization + Domestic 
credit provided by banking sector)] 
Invt  log [Financial Assets of Investment Companies / (Total Financial 
Asset of Institutional Investors + Market Capitalization + Domestic 
credit provided by banking sector)] 
 
The key data for the analysis was collected from the Institutional Investors 
Statistical Yearbook (OECD) and the World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
                                                            
5 These OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
   13
The stock market dataset is gathered from the Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 
OECD (various years). 
The domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP is used as a 
measure of the activity of financial intermediaries in channeling savings to investors. 
Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine et. al. (1999) and Beck et. al. (1999) have 
employed this indicator in the examination of the impact of financial sector 
development on economic growth. It is vital to note that this indicator measures only 
the ‘traditional’ role of the banking sector in providing loans and advances and does 
not capture the growing importance of off-balance sheet activities (including the 
provision of insurance, pension and investment services) of  the banking sector. Thus, 
this measure will be able to isolate the main credit activities of the financial 
intermediaries. 
Beck et.al (1999) outline three key stock market indicators in measuring its 
size, activity and efficiency.  Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio (MC) measures 
the size of stock market as it aggregates the value of all listed shares in the stock 
market. It is assumed that the overall stock market size is positively correlated with 
the ability to mobilize capital and to diversify risk at an economy wide basis
6. 
However, the size of the stock market does not necessarily reflect its liquidity. Thus 
the level of the liquidity of the stock market in channelling capital is captured by the 
total value of stocks traded in the domestic stock exchanges to GDP ratio (VT). 
Liquidity in the stock markets reduces the disincentive to investments as it provides 
more efficient resource allocation and hence economic growth. 
 While MC captures the size and VT reflects the level of liquidity, the 
efficiency of the domestic stock market is captured by the turnover ratio (TR). The TR 
                                                            
6 The main shortcoming of Market Capitalization is that theory does not suggest the mere listing of 
shares will influence resource allocation and growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) showed that Market 
Capitalization is not a good predictor of economic growth.   14
ratio is defined as the ratio of the value of total shares traded to market capitalization. 
A small but active stock market will have a high turnover ratio as compared to a large 
but less liquid stock market. In both these cases, the turnover ratio would provide a 
more robust indication of the activity of the stock market.  
The role of institutional investors in this study is captured by the ratio of total 
financial assets of institutional investors to GDP. However, as most financial assets of 
institutional investors consist of loans, stock and bonds, we further normalized the 
total financial assets of institutional investors by dividing it with the sum of total 
financial assets of institutional investors, stock market capitalization and domestic 
credit provided by banking sector. This would provide a better weightage and proxy 
in measuring the ‘aggregated’ functionality of institutional investors
7. We also further 
analyzed the impact of different components of institutional investor for pension 
funds, insurance companies and investment companies respectively. The total 
financial assets for pension funds (Pen), insurance companies (Ins) and investment 
companies (Invt) are similarly normalized with the procedure outlined above
8.  To 
measure the level of economic activity, we employ real gross domestic product (GDP) 
at 1995 US prices.  
3.2 Dynamic Panel VAR 
  This paper employs a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model to analyze 
the impact of institutional investors on financial sector development and economic 
growth. This model combines the traditional VAR approach, which treats all the 
                                                            
7 Studies by Catalan et. al. (2000) employ basic measures like contractual savings financial assets over 
GDP to capture the size of contractual savings institutions relative to GDP. This suffers from a major 
problem as financial assets of institutional investors would consist of stock portfolio holdings and 
hence augmenting a multicollinearity problem. Impavido et. al. (2003) improved upon this variable by 
employing a normalization procedure that is similar to this paper. They further confirm that this 
normalized variable corrects for price movements that might have caused correlation between 
institutional investors and financial sector development. 
8 In measuring the economic and financial impact of insurance companies, Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) 
used total insurance premium. Similarly, Outreville (1996) also used the ratio of gross domestic 
premiums to GDP in his studies of insurance companies in developing countries.   15
variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel data approach, which controls 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. More specifically, a dynamic tri-variate 
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, , 3 , ε ϑ η ρ β α    (3) 
where each equation is estimated separately. In this specification, ηi capture all 
unobserved country-specific time invariant effects,  t ϑ  is a full set of time dummies to 
account for trending behaviour and  t i, ε  is the random error term which is assumed not 
to be correlated across countries and time. The variables Xi,t, Yi,t  and Zi,t are 
interchanged with the variables identified in Table 1
9.  
Given the short time period in the data, we restricted the maximum lags to 2. 
In a PVAR model, the test on Granger causality is imposed on the respective lagged 
coefficients. For example, to test whether x Granger causes y in equation (1) requires 
a Wald test with the hypothesis of β1,1= β1,2= 0.  
Although including lagged dependent variables in the panel enables the 
examination of the dynamics between the variables in study, Nickell (1981)
 10 showed 
that this leads to biased estimation especially if the time dimension of the panel is 
                                                            
9 For example in examining the impact of institutional investor (IINVEST) on stock market 
capitalization (MC) after controlling for banking effects (DC) in equation 1, the y-variable represents 
MC, x represents IINVEST and z represents DC. The dynamics of reverse causality is further examined 
in the specification of equation 2 and 3 respectively.  
10 The usual approach to estimating fixed effects models is by employing the least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) estimator which tends to generate a biased estimate of the coefficients. Nickell (1981) 
derives an expression for this bias when there are no exogenous regressors, showing that the bias 
approaches zero as T approaches infinity. Judson and Owen (1997) showed that this bias can be as 
much as 20 percent even as T approached 30.   16
relatively short, like in this study. To improve the estimation, Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) suggested a two-step instrumental variable (IV) procedure that includes first 
differencing the dynamic panel and instrumenting the difference equation with the 
lagged level or lagged difference
11 of the dependent variable, which are uncorrelated 
with the disturbance in the difference equation but correlated with the difference 
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where  1 , , , , − − = ∆ = t i t i t i t i y y y y ,  1 , , , , − − = ∆ = t i t i t i t i x x x x , and  1 , , , , − − = ∆ = t i t i t i t i z z z z . 
The IV estimation as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) does not 
necessarily yield efficient estimates, since it does not make use of all the available 
moment conditions and also does not account for the differenced structure of the new 
error terms. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a panel GMM estimation procedure 
that improves on Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981) IV estimation
12. More specifically, the 
GMM estimation procedure is employed to deal with two key issues in panel 
estimation: the endogeneity or non –orthogonality of the regressors that is reflected in 
the correlation between these variables and the error term, and second, the differenced 
error term is by construction correlated with the lagged dependent variables. The 
advantage of the GMM estimation procedure is that it employs additional linear 
                                                            
11 Arellano (1989) shows that using the lagged difference as an instrument results in an estimator that 
has a very large variance. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Kiviet (1995) further confirm the superiority 
of using the lagged level as an instrument with simulation results. 
12 Arellano and Bond (1991) run a Monte Carlo experiment to judge the Anderson-Hsiao estimator 
against various GMM estimators and find that the GMM procedures produce substantial efficiency 
gains.   17
instrumental variables which uses predetermined lagged level as instruments to 
exploit a potentially large set of overidentifying restrictions to deliver consistent 
coefficient estimates. Generally the following moment conditions are applied: 
0 )] .( [ 1 = − − − it it j it Y E ε ε   for j ≥ 2 
0 )] .( [ 1 = − − − it it j it X E ε ε  for j ≥  2     -  (7) 
In this paper, we employed a ‘restricted GMM’ estimation procedure as only 
appropriate and current lagged values are selected. This is because as Hsiao (2003: 
pp.90) found that while it is theoretically possible to add additional moment 
conditions to improve the asymptotic efficiency of the GMM estimation, it is doubtful 
how much efficiency gain can be achieved by using a huge number of moment 
conditions in a finite sample. Furthermore, if higher moment conditions are used, the 
estimator can be very sensitive to outlying observations. For example, Ziliak’s (1997) 
simulation finds that the downward bias in GMM is quite severe as the number of 
moment conditions expands, outweighing the efficiency gains
13. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed two GMM estimators to estimate a 
dynamic panel, namely the one-step and the two-step estimator
14. Bond (2002) and 
Bond and Windmeijer (2002) outlines the applicability of the one-step estimator in 
applied work due to the fact that the one-step estimator produces less biased and more 
efficient estimates that the two-step alternative. In our study, we used the one-step 
GMM estimator.   
                                                            
13 Further usage of additional instruments like the lag of the first difference of the dependent and 
explanatory variables for the regression in levels as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) are not 
employed extensively due to the short panel. The extended GMM estimator; more frequently known as 
the system GMM estimator uses moment conditions well in excess of the number of unknown 
parameters and can therefore be subjected to important small sample bias.  
14 Generally, in the one-step estimation, the error terms are assumed to be independent and 
homoskedastic across countries and over time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting 
matrix that is used to produce one-step coefficient estimates. On the other hand, the two-step estimator 
employs the residuals obtained in the one-step estimator to construct a consistent estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix, which is then used to re-estimate the parameters.   18
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends firstly on whether lagged 
values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the model outlined above 
and secondly if the assumption of no serial correlation in the errors holds. The 
specification test for the former involves the utilization of the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing 
the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines the assumption of no 
serial correlation in the error term, ei,t , by testing whether the differenced error term 
are second order serially correlated (Arellano and Bond, 1991). If the test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation, we conclude 
that the original error term is serially uncorrelated which gives support to the model. 
4.  Causal Relationship Between Economic Growth, Financial Sector 
Development and Institutional Investors in PVAR Framework 
  
In this section, we will empirically analyze Granger causality between 
institutional investors, financial sector development and economic growth. Firstly we 
examine the aggregated impact of institutional investors directly on the development 
of financial institutions consisting of banks and stock market. Secondly we examine 
the relationship between institutional investors and economic growth.  
4.1 Institutional Investors (Aggregated) and Financial Sector Development 
Table 2 outlines a tri-variate PVAR model that examines the dynamic relationship 
between institutional investors, banking sector and various stock market indicators 
respectively. Specification tests of no second order serial correlation in the 
differenced error term and non-rejection of the Sargan over-identifying test supports 
the findings in our model
15. The key finding of this study is that there is a strong 
                                                            
15 Due to brevity, the results for the specification tests of no second order serial correlation and Sargan 
over-identifying test is not included in the main text but is available from the authors. The results of no   19
causal impact of institutional investors in OECD countries on the development of 
various aspects to the stock market characteristics.  
Table 2: Tri-variate PVAR model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for 
OECD countries with Institutional Investors and Financial Sector  
Model Effect  (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t  ∆ Stock t  ∆ DC t 
 
1  F-∆IINVEST t  -   0.0001 ***   0.5967 
  F-∆MC t   0.0225 **  -   0.0865 
  F-∆DC t   0.3135   0.1703  - 
       
2  F-∆IINVEST t  -   0.0001 ***   0.6852 
  F-∆VT t   0.5088  -   0.0480 ** 
  F-∆DC t   0.2134   0.7079  - 
       
3  F-∆IINVEST t  -   0.0017 ***   0.6511 
  F-∆TR t   0.9883  -   0.6934 
  F-∆DC t   0.8353   0.5001  - 
       
Note: 
1)  *, ** and *** denotes p-value Wald/ F-test rejection of Granger non-causality at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
2)  Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
 
From Table 2, we find that institutional investment Granger causes stock market 
capitalization, the value of stock traded and turnover ratio. This finding also is in line 
with earlier studies by Impavido et. al. (2000). However, as compared to our study, 
the previous studies focused solely on the impact of ‘contractual savings’ institutions 
which only consists of pension funds and insurance companies. We also find some 
evidence of reverse causality, but this feedback is only apparent from the market 
capitalization rather than the liquidity or turnover of the stock market. There is also no 
causality either from institutional investors to the development of the banking sector 
or banking sector to the development of the institutional investors. This is intuitive as 
we have seen from Figure 3 in the previous section that the proportion of bank loans 
in the portfolio of institutional investors has decreased over time. As the banking 
variable is defined as the amount of domestic bank loans to the private sector, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
second-order serial correlation and non-rejection of Sargan test holds for both aggregated and 
disaggregated analysis.   20
shrinking share of bank loans in the portfolios of institutional investors validates the 
insignificant relationship between banks and institutional investors. Besides this, there 
is a diminishing trend in the traditional activities of the banking sector in accepting 
loans and providing loans.  Hence, the growth of institutional investors would directly 
erode the traditional role of the banking sector. 
4.2 Institutional Investors (Aggregated) and Economic Growth 
In Table 3, we extended the analysis by incorporating the possible impact 
from the development of institutional investors on economic growth. The key result 
supports our hypothesis that institutional investors have a significant direct causal 
impact on GDP, even after accounting for various financial market indicators. It is 
apparent that the channel of transmission is through the stock market as opposed to 
the banking sector as indicated by models 5, 6 and 7 in Table 3. This direct impact on 
GDP is statistically significant at the 5 percent level when market capitalization is 
employed, while it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level when both stock 
traded and turnover ratio are used. Furthermore, the direct impact of institutional 
investors on GDP is uni-directional with no feedback effect from GDP to institutional 
investors.  
The impact of institutional investors on various financial indicators remains 
consistent to the earlier findings. For example, we found no effect of institutional 
investors on the banking sector. This result is similar to the one which we found 
earlier in Table 2. The high statistical significance (1 percent) of institutional 
investors is apparent when we employ the three different stock market indicators: 
stock market capitalization, stock traded and turnover ratio. While there is only uni-
directional causality for the last two stock market indicators, again we found a bi-
directional causality when market capitalization is employed. This suggests that   21
institutional investors not only Granger causes market capitalization, but the 
successful development of institutional investors also requires a certain threshold size 
in the stock market. This is illustrative as it shows that size rather than liquidity is the 
main criterion for the development of institutional investors. 
Table 3: Tri-variate PVAR model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for 
OECD countries with GDP, Institutional Investors and Financial Sector 
Model Effect  (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t  ∆GDP t  ∆ Financial Sector t 
4  F-∆IINVEST t  - 0.2038  0.2049 
  F-∆GDP t  0.6715 -  0.0434  ** 
  F-∆DC t  0.9648 0.0001  ***  - 
        
5  F-∆IINVEST t  - 0.0328  **  0.0001  ** 
  F-∆GDP t  0.7774 -  0.0257  ** 
  F-∆MC t  0.0718* 0.0973* - 
        
6  F-∆IINVEST t  - 0.0096  ***  0.0001  *** 
  F-∆GDP t  0.9101 -  0.0440  ** 
  F-∆VT t  0.6555 0.1633 - 
        
7  F-∆IINVEST t  -  0.0093 ***  0.0017 *** 
  F-∆GDP t  0.5066 -  0.0501* 
  F-∆TR t  0.5801 0.0192  **  - 
        
Note:  
1)  *, ** and *** denotes p-value Wald/ F-test rejection of Granger non-causality at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
2)  Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
3)  Financial Sector in the last column represents the respective financial variable used in the PVAR. 
 
In Table 4, we employed a four-variable difference PVAR model that 
combines together GDP, the aggregated financial assets of institutional investors, 
banking sector, and various stock market indicators interchangeably. There is 
evidence of institutional investment spurring economic growth in most of the 
frameworks with the slight exception of model 10 (the TR-framework). Furthermore, 
there is no evidence of reverse causality from GDP to institutional investors, which is 
consistent with our earlier findings.  
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Table 4: Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for OECD countries with GDP, 
Institutional Investors, Banks and Stock Market 
Model Effect  (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t  ∆GDP t  ∆DC t  ∆STOCK t 
 
8  F-∆IINVEST t  -   0.0537 *   0.3668   0.0001 *** 
  F-∆GDP t   0.6626  -   0.0250 **   0.0010 *** 
  F-∆DC t   0.4712   0.0006 ***  -   0.1275 
  F-∆MC t   0.0244 **   0.2029   0.2329  - 
          
9  F-∆IINVEST t  -   0.0448 **   0.3969   0.0001 *** 
  F-∆GDP t   0.5888  -   0.0512 *   0.0640 * 
  F-∆DC t   0.8820   0.0001 ***  -   0.6196 
  F-∆VT t   0.4758   0.1449   0.2832  - 
          
10  F-∆IINVEST t  -   0.1043   0.3614   0.0160 ** 
  F-∆GDP t   0.4941  -   0.0375 **   0.0606 * 
  F-∆DC t   0.9473   0.0001 ***  -   0.4006 
  F-∆TR t   0.5530   0.1218   0.7575  - 
          
Note:  
1)  *, ** and *** denotes p-value Wald/ F-test rejection of Granger non-causality at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
2)  Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
3) Stock t  in the last column represents the respective stock market variable used in the PVAR. 
 
We next examined the dynamics of institutional investor participation in the 
development of the financial sectors. We found that the activities of institutional 
investor participation lead to the growth of securities market as indicated by the 
significance of all the stock market variables. More specifically, institutional 
investment enhances the growth in stock market capitalization, value traded and 
turnover; and it is more significant effect on the former two indicators. Again no 
feedback effect was found with the exception of model 8 (market capitalization, MC 
framework). We also find that there seems to be no causal effect between institutional 
investors and the banking sector. 
 
4.3 Institutional Investors (Disaggregated) and Financial Sector Development 
 
The previous estimations have examined the impact of institutional investors 
at the aggregate level. We extend this analysis to examine the disaggregated impact of 
pension funds, insurance and investment companies on financial sector development   23
and economic growth. Studies in this area have focused on the impact of ‘contractual 
savings’ institutions of pension funds and life insurance companies while completely 
omitting the analysis on investment companies. Impavido et. al. (2003) employed a 
multivariate panel GMM method in examining the relationship between contractual 
savings institutions with banking and securities markets respectively. They 
hypothesized that the ‘captive’ nature of contractual institutions would lengthen the 
duration of investments and liabilities while investment companies, especially open-
end investment companies, generally have a shorter-term outlook. According to them, 
‘contractual savings institutions have a natural advantage over open-ended investment 
companies in financing long-term investment projects and their investment strategies 
will be more biased towards long-term bonds and the equity markets’(Impavido et. al, 
2003). Gooptu (1993) also acknowledges that in contrast to investment companies, 
who switch rapidly in search of short-run returns, pension funds and life insurance 
companies could be taken as a risk-adverse group interested in participating in long-
term investment. However the rapid growth of investment companies coupled with 
the ‘open-endedness’ characteristics of some contractual savings institutions warrants 
a disaggregated study of institutional investors
16.  
A disaggregated empirical study was undertaken by Catalan et. al. (2000)
17 for 
a group of developed and developing countries. Using bi-variate VAR, they examined 
the interaction of pension funds, life insurance and non-life insurance companies with 
two securities market indicators: market capitalization and value traded. Whilst 
confirming the direction of causality from contractual savings institutions to 
                                                            
16 According to Impavido et. al. (2003), ‘although open pension funds (as opposed to closed pension 
funds, which are employer-sponsored plans) operate like open-end investment companies, their funds 
are more stable because they are captive to the industry as a whole. Hence, open pension funds are less 
exposed to systemic risks than are open-end investment companies.’ 
17 A limitation of this study is the focus on the analysis of impact of contractual savings institutions on 
securities market only.   24
promoting the development of market capitalization as opposed to value traded
18, a 
key finding of their paper is the stronger causality impact of this activity in 
developing countries. For example, they found that in the USA, there is no evidence 
of either uni-directional or bi-directional causality between contractual savings 
institutions and stock markets. They attributed this finding to the dilution of the 
illiquidity effect of contractual savings institutions in countries with well developed 
financial markets (Catalan et. al., 2000).  
As compared to our study on aggregated institutional investors, the results of 
the disaggregated study in Table A1 in the appendix suggest that this impact of 
institutional investors on financial sector development is driven mainly by the 
activities of the investment company activities. While Impavido et. al. (2003) found 
that contractual savings institutions have a positive impact on stock market depth 
(market capitalization) and no significant impact on liquidity (value traded), we found 
that at a the disaggregated level, both pension funds and insurance companies have 
significant impact on value traded and turnover ratio respectively. Individually, both 
pension funds and insurance companies do not have significant impact on market 
capitalization, but we do find evidence of Granger causality from investment 
companies to market capitalization. This result is indeed contrary to the findings of 
Impavido et. al. (2003). On a more conciliatory finding, Holzmann (1997) found that 
pension funds increases both the liquidity and market capitalization for the 
Argentinean economy.     
                                                            
18 Impavido and Musalem (2000) accepted the direction of causality from contractual savings to capital 
markets. Impavido et. al. (2003) further confirms this, while finding that this impact is (a) ‘non linear’ 
in countries with a higher degree of transparency, (b) robust to the overall level of development, 
education, demographic structure and legal environment, and (c) heterogeneous among countries that 
have a market based financial system, mandatory pension contributions and lower international 
securities transactions.     25
Our seemingly contradictory evidence that contractual savings institutions lead 
to liquidity (value traded) and efficiency (turnover ratio) dislodges the popular notion 
that these contractual savings institutions, especially pension funds, follow adherently 
to the ‘buy and hold’ strategy. One could reasonably argue that this higher turnover of 
equities provides scant evidence either of short-terminism on the part of these 
contractual savings institutions or performance mandate increasingly focused on 
quarterly reporting. Furthermore the growing amount of funds channelled from 
‘contractual savings institutions’ to both internally established and externally 
managed investment companies helps explain the importance of these investment 
companies in the development of the stock market. In general, the results suggest that 
the need for liquidity is the overriding factor not only for investment companies, but 
increasingly also for both pension funds and insurance companies. 
  On the other hand, the result in Table A1 shows sufficient evidence of 
feedback from stock market development to both pension funds and insurance 
companies. More specifically, a large and liquid stock market Granger causes pension 
funds. This is because “the implementation of some active and sophisticated financial 
strategies require very frequent trading and given the large volume of funds managed 
by pension funds, the price volatility implied by these strategies would be too high if 
the stock market is not liquid enough” (Catalan et. al., 2000).  
4.4 Institutional Investors (Disaggregated) and Economic Growth 
The result of the impact of institutional investors on economic growth is given 
in Table A2 in the appendix. In our PVAR study, we find pension fund, insurance 
companies and investment companies Granger causes economic growth.  
  While economic growth and pension funds nexus has been extensively 
developed, that of the insurance firms and especially for investment companies is a   26
fairly recent development and the very focus of this study. Outrevillle (1990, 1996) 
pioneered the examination of the relationship between insurance development and 
economic growth for developing countries. His findings indicated that both non-life 
(Outrevillle, 1990) and life (Outrevillle, 1996) insurance companies Granger causes 
economic growth. Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) extended Outreville’s study by 
employing a time series vector error correction model (VECM) for nine OECD 
countries. They found no causality in either direction especially in US and UK, which 
is mainly attributed to the high measures of insurance density in these countries. 
According to them, the importance of insurance to economic growth is not necessarily 
in its levels of activity, rather its significance is derived from the rate of structural 
change in an economy that results from an increase in level of insurance provision.  
In our PVAR analysis, we found that on aggregate, insurance companies in 
OECD countries Granger causes economic growth. With regards to the investment 
companies and economic growth nexus, to our knowledge, this study is the first 
attempt in confirming causality from investment companies to economic growth in a 
panel framework. Meanwhile, the feedback impact from institutional investors to 
economic growth is only apparent for investment companies, thereby suggesting a 
dynamic interaction between economic growth and the growth of investment 
companies. 
5. Conclusion 
The phenomenal growth of institutional investor has lead to the growing 
ownership of the financial sector by institutional investors. We have found 
collectively that these institutional investors have enhanced the growth of the stock 
markets at the expense of the loans advancements and deposit taking function of the 
banking sector. Overall the Granger causality in the growth of institutional investment   27
to the development of the financial sector has spilled over to economic growth. 
Similar causality issues are examined for each segment of institutional investors: 
pension funds, insurance companies, and investment companies. As hypothesized, 
causality varies along these different types of institutional investors. We found the 
development of the stock market, in particular market capitalization Granger causes 
the development of contractual savings institutions that consist of pension funds and 
insurance companies. While this reverse causality finding is contrary to studies done 
at the developing and OECD countries, we believe the maturity and large coverage of 
these contractual savings institutions dilutes the impact in deepening the stock market. 
However, we do find evidence that these contractual savings institutions do lead to 
various aspects of stock market liquidity. In addition, the results indicate that banking 
sector development does help pension fund growth, reflecting its risk-adverse nature 
in portfolio investment. Another key finding of this study is the significant role of 
investment companies in Granger causing both banking and stock market 
development, with no evidence of reverse causality. Studies at the individual country 
level which take into consideration of country specific factors like cultural, historical, 
legal and developmental would add to the richness of our results and could provide 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Tri-variable PVAR model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for 
OECD countries with Institutional Investors (Pension, Insurance and 
Investment), Banks and Stock Market Capitalization 




∆ MC t  ∆DC t 
11  F-IINVEST t (Pen)  -   0.1677   0.9653 
  F-∆MC t   0.0119 **  -   0.9260 
  F-∆DC t   0.0001 ***   0.0050 ***  - 
       
12  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  -   0.2032   0.9996 
  F-∆MC t   0.0774 *  -   0.0776 * 
  F-∆DC t   0.8934   0.2584  - 
       
13  F-∆IINVEST t (Invt)  -   0.0161 **   0.0487 ** 
  F-∆MC t   0.9804  -   0.1522 
  F-∆DC t   0.2470   0.1367  - 
    ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ VT t  ∆DC t 
14  F-∆IINVEST t (Pen)  - 0.0963  *  0.8957 
  F-∆VT t  0.0377 **  -  0.9147 
  F-∆DC t  0.0402 **  0.1067  - 
       
15  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  - 0.1202  0.9921 
  F-∆VT t  0.2968 -  0.0435  ** 
  F-∆DC t  0.6975 0.7416 - 
       
16  F-∆IINVEST t (Invt)  -  0.0068 ***  0.0503 * 
  F-∆VT t  0.6199 -  0.0919  * 
  F-∆DC t  0.2120 0.5128 - 
    ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ TR t  ∆DC t 
17  F-∆IINVEST t (Pen)  - 0.1237  0.7546 
  F-∆TR t  0.4867 -  0.7116 
  F-∆DC t  0.0991 *  0.3718  - 
       
18  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  - 0.0072  ***  0.9773 
  F-∆TR t  0.2681 -  0.5622 
  F-∆DC t  0.8112 0.5242 - 
       
19  F-∆IINVEST t (Invt)  -  0.0076 ***  0.0730 * 
  F-∆TR t  0.4213 -  0.5133 
  F-∆DC t  0.2577 0.3846 - 
Note:  
1)  *, ** and *** denotes p-value Wald/ F-test rejection of Granger non-causality at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
2)  Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
3)  IInvest t  represents the institutional investors of pension funds, insurance companies and investment 
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Table A2: Tri-variate PVAR model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for 
OECD countries with GDP, Individual Institutional Investors (Pension, 
Insurance and Investment) and Financial Sector indicators 
Model Effect  (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t (various)  ∆ GDP t  ∆DC t 
20  ∆IINVEST t (Pen)  - 0.0001  ***  0.5867 
  F-∆GDP t  0.3550 -  0.7237 
  F-∆DC t  0.0276 *  0.0666 *  - 
21  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  - 0.0596  *  0.7446 
  F-∆GDP t  0.5277 -  0.2204 
  F-∆DC t  0.8465 0.0002  ***  - 
22  ∆IINVEST t (Invt)  - 0.0685  *  0.5236 
  F-∆GDP t  0.0765 *  -  0.2758 
  F-∆DC t  0.2287 0.0204  **  - 
    ∆IINVEST t (various)  ∆ GDP t  ∆MC t 
23  ∆IINVEST t (Pen)  - 0.0001  ***  0.4283 
  F-∆GDP t  0.0002 ***  -  0.1192 
  F-∆MC t  0.0020 ***  0.0077 ***  - 
24  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  - 0.0978  *  0.1897 
  F-∆GDP t  0.5857 -  0.0010  *** 
  F-∆MC t  0.0915* 0.0791  *  - 
25  ∆IINVEST t (Invt)  -  0.0066 ***  0.0303 ** 
  F-∆GDP t  0.1040 -  0.0400  ** 
  F-∆MC t  0.9998 0.1318  - 
    ∆IINVEST t (various)  ∆ GDP t  ∆VT t 
26  ∆IINVEST t (Pen)  - 0.0001  ***  0.2183 
  F-∆GDP t  0.7299 -  0.0183  ** 
  F-∆VT t  0.0918* 0.6268  - 
27  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  - 0.0181  **  0.2018 
  F-∆GDP t  0.4281 -  0.0838  * 
  F-∆VT t  0.3277 0.0972  *  - 
28  ∆IINVEST t (Invt)  -  0.001 ***  0.0010 *** 
  F-∆GDP t  0.0978 *  -  0.0001 *** 
  F-∆VT t  0.5069 0.4244  - 
    ∆IINVEST t (various)  ∆ GDP t  ∆TR t 
29  ∆IINVEST t (Pen)  - 0.0001  ***  0.1389 
  F-∆GDP t  0.7013 -  0.0549 
  F-∆TR t  0.7452 0.0553  *  - 
30  F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins)  - 0.07878  *  0.0193  ** 
  F-∆GDP t  0.5924 -  0.1326 
  F-∆TR t  0.3656 0.0103  **  - 
31  ∆IINVEST t (Invt)  -  0.0055 ***  0.0927 * 
  F-∆GDP t  0.0310 **  -  0.0009 *** 
  F-∆TR t  0.3376 0.0696  *  - 
Note:  
1)  *, ** and *** denotes p-value Wald/ F-test rejection of Granger non-causality at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. 
2)  Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
3) IInvest t  represents the institutional investors of pension funds, insurance companies and 
investment companies respectively used in the estimation. 
 
 
 